

11th Annual Pacific IO & EW Symposium

October 17-21, 2022 | Honolulu, HI | Camp H.M. Smith, HI

SYMPOSIUM THEME

The theme for the 2022 Pacific IO & EW Symposium, “Implementing Integrated Deterrence,” will focus on how Information Operations (IO) and Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (EMSO) contribute to effective deterrence against gray zone actions, coercion, and war.

Why focus on integrated deterrence?

On April 29, 2021, during the Change of Command for USINDOPACOM, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin announced a new focus of the U.S. National Defense Strategy, namely, Integrated Deterrence, which emphasized coordination with Allies and partners.¹ Secretary Austin also described integrated as having application to both deterrence of conventional war, but also to gray zone actions and coercion.² This dual emphasis is appropriate for Combatant Command (CCMD) campaigning. Integrated Deterrence is a cornerstone of the 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy, which reinforces the focus on deterring aggression and countering coercion against U.S. territory, and that of our Allies and partners.³ The strategy includes an action plan to be carried out from 2022-2024, which includes a specific line of effort for deterrence “Reinforce Deterrence” which explains that the U.S. will “deter military aggression against our own country and our allies and partners—including across the Taiwan Strait—and promote regional security by developing new capabilities, concepts of operation, military activities, defense industrial initiatives, and a more resilient force posture.”⁴ The most dangerous adversary action to be deterred in the USINDOPACOM area of responsibility (AOR) is that of a military force against Taiwan, which ADM Aquilino highlighted in his remarks at this confirmation hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, emphasizing that force posture, and the contributions of Allies and partners were key components of the overall effort to deter Communist China from invading Taiwan.⁵ There is a key role for the inform and influence Information Related Capabilities (IRCs) to communicate proof of progress in these efforts to Allies, partners, and adversaries alike.

Why do we need integrated deterrence?

One major reason is risk of unexpected outcomes of deterrence efforts that are not fully integrated. America’s adversaries are actively campaigning, often operating in the gray zone, with some adversaries active in more than one CCMD AOR. U.S. deterrence efforts against one adversary “may have undesired and unforeseen second and third order effects on our assurance, dissuasion, and deterrence efforts focused on other actors.”⁶ The CCMDs must therefore ensure that they are integrating deterrence with fellow CCMDs and across the other

instruments of national power. USINDOPACOM shares a common threat with Russia that is of course a core focus for both USEUCOM and USSTRATCOM. Communist China's ever-expanding global presence and malign influence activities require all the CCMDs to coordinate their deterrence efforts for global mitigation of the threats its military presents.

Detering both Conventional War and Gray Zone Actions and Coercion.

As described by SECDEF Austin, Integrated Deterrence must address both conventional warfare, as well as gray zone actions / coercion. The traditional forms of deterrence familiar to most military planners are strategic deterrence of nuclear war and deterring conventional war. LTG James Dubik has proposed recently that there is a third form, which is "detering our adversaries from achieving their strategic goals below the threshold of conventional war," in the competition space where our adversaries employ coercion and activities carried out through "gray zone operations" often with hybrid forces and means.⁷ Military analysts Ashley Townshend and Dr. David Santoro argue that "gray zone activities can be deterred — including certain types of maritime coercion, political interference, and cyber activity."⁸

However, we are late to the starting blocks, as Communist Chinese gray-zone actions and coercion have resulted in incremental shifts in the regional security situation detrimental to U.S. interests, while also enhancing China's conventional deterrence posture represented by A2/AD and long-range precision fires. Many believe that the U.S. is losing the overall "deterrence fight" during competition, as it struggles to deter, counter, or block adversary gray zone activities and to deter conventional war. LTG Dubik and many others have argued that the U.S. is failing at this third form of deterrence.⁹ As reporter and author Sean McFate observed, traditional deterrence is challenged "...because our adversaries wage war but disguise it as peace."¹⁰ If Integrated Deterrence is to be the cornerstone of the Indo-Pacific Strategy, then countering gray zone actions is necessary to arrest the slow slide to war, as Russia's 2022 "special military operation" into Ukraine has recently demonstrated. This conventional war followed six years after its hybrid warfare campaign to seize the Crimea and carry out a proxy war in Eastern Ukraine, without much consequence from the West.

There is an urgency to get our deterrence posture set, and deterrence operations underway. Regarding the threat of Chinese Communist conventional warfare against Taiwan, ADM Aquilino commented "... this problem is much closer to us than most think, and we have to take this on, put those deterrence capabilities ... in place, in the near term and with urgency."¹¹ Deterrence must be integrated into a CCMD Theater Campaign Plan and OPLANS. As Melissa Dalton, (Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans and Capabilities) recently asked "how do we fully integrate them [deterrence operations] not just as an afterthought, but as a deliberate part of our planning and operations?"¹² The information environment and electromagnetic spectrum are critical domains where gray zone actions take place, therefore, information operations and electromagnetic spectrum operations must be part of deliberate plans and deterrence operations. Integrated deterrence must be built into campaign planning, and our intent and objectives clearly communicated. As Major General Matt Easley, deputy Principal Information Operations Advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, emphasized at the first OSD Phoenix Challenge information operations conference of 2022 ,

“[w]e must refocus campaign planning to start with objectives in the cognitive domain, understand what narratives are needed to achieve that objective, and then develop plans for both physical actions that show commitment to that narrative.”¹³

Allied and Partner Contributions

As our European Allies and partners react to the Russian war of invasion of Ukraine, our Indo-Pacific Allies and partners look to the potential for Communist China to start a war of invasion of Taiwan. Secretary Austin, in remarks delivered in Warsaw six days before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, emphasized the importance of working with a network of Allies and partners to achieve integrated deterrence, saying that what was “most important” for the success of integrated deterrence is “using the capability and capacity that’s resident in our partners and allies.”¹⁴ In a critique on the likely effectiveness of the new approach, Thomas Spoehr agreed that “allies can contribute to a favorable correlation of forces” that our adversaries Communist China and Russia would consider, before deciding on military aggression.¹⁵

Deterring war from breaking out in the Indo-Pacific will require a more networked approach with our Allies and partners, and a commonly shared appreciation of the destabilizing gray zone and coercion actions of Communist China, and how these increase the likelihood of armed conflict as China grows ever more assertive. U.S. assurance of Allies and partners is the other side of the coin to deterrence operations, “as the success or failure of this effort informs the adversary’s decision calculus on whether the conditions favor taking military action.”¹⁶ Efforts to reassure Allies that we will provide them with the necessary means for their self-defense, our faithful adherence to mutual defense treaties, and continuous bilateral and multilateral exercises all help to demonstrate that the U.S. can form a coalition in crisis, and maintain it, and assures allies that the U.S. is the security partner of choice. Furthermore, assurance actions increase the resolve of a U.S. led coalition, and demonstrate increased US Stake in the crisis, which increases U.S. will to fight. As Heidi Shyu, Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, recently remarked during the USINDOPACOM and National Defense Industrial Association co-sponsored Pacific Operational Science and Technology Conference in Honolulu, “The Russian invasion of Ukraine has amplified the criticality of increasing our collaboration with allies and partners.”¹⁷

Roles for IO and EW in Deterrence Operations

According to the Joint Operating Concept for Deterrence Operations, information operations in support of deterrence focus on psychological operations, cyberspace warfare operations, deception, and electromagnetic warfare capabilities “that can affect adversary morale and unit cohesion, decision-making, lines of communication (LOCs), logistics, command and control (C2), and other key adversary functions” while at the same time protecting our plans and operations through OPSEC.¹⁸

CALL FOR PRESENTATIONS

INDOPACOM J39 and the AOC are soliciting original unclassified English language presentations and/or papers for the 11th Pacific IO & EMSO Symposium from subject matter experts in the U.S. and Allied militaries / government, as well as from academia and industry on the conference theme. Presentations for the full plenary session in the first two days of symposium must be UNCLASSIFIED, and Distribution Statement A, Public Release. Presentations for the classified plenary sessions at Camp Smith should be at the SECRET//REL TO USA, DEU, FRA, JPN, KOR, FVEY level, or at higher classification for smaller group break-out sessions in other conference rooms at Camp Smith

Potential Speakers are invited to note the conference sessions topics and specific areas of interest:

- * Studies of, and lessons learned on recent deterrence successes and failures.
- * Applicable lessons learned from historical deterrence operations and campaigns (e.g. Cold War deterrence of the Communist Bloc).
- * The challenges in effectively deterring gray zone actions and coercion.
- * Analysis of adversary and potential adversary deterrence strategies and concepts.
- * EMS in global commons (space, air, maritime), international conventions, and national maritime and airspace claims as they apply to competition and deterrence operations.
- * Experimentation, Exercises and Training that would improve execution of the deter/assure components of the 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy.

Please contact the Symposium Chair, Dr. Arthur Tulak, COL USA, Ret, at arthur.n.tulak.ctr@pacom.mil if you are interested in speaking or want more information and provide the title of the proposed paper, a brief synopsis, and biography of the speaker. Industry presentations that support the conference theme may be submitted for either the unclassified or classified plenaries. Industry presentations must focus on the symposium theme and should not simply be product-focused. The deadline for submitting is close of business Wednesday, July 20, 2022, but earlier is better.

End Notes:

¹ Todd Lopez, (APRIL 30, 2021), “Defense Secretary Says 'Integrated Deterrence' Is Cornerstone of U.S. Defense,” DOD NEWS, <https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2592149/defense-secretary-says-integrated-deterrence-is-cornerstone-of-us-defense/>

² Lloyd Austin III, Secretary of Defense, (July 27, 2021), <https://twitter.com/secdef/status/1419967987566747660>

³ Indo-Pacific Strategy of The United States, February 2022, White House, p. 12.

<https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf>

⁴ Ibid, p. 15.

⁵ Mallory Shelbourne, March 23, 2021, “Military Takeover of Taiwan is Top Concern for INDOPACOM Nominee Aquilino,” USNI News, <https://news.usni.org/2021/03/23/military-takeover-of-taiwan-is-top-concern-for-indopacom-nominee-aquilino>

⁶ The Joint Staff, *Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept* Version 2.0 December 2006, pp. 49 & 50.

<https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA490279.pdf>

⁷ LTG, James Dubik, USA, Ret., (February 2022), “Deterrence: Looking Below the Conventional Threshold,” *Army Magazine*, Vol. 72, No. 2, p. 5. <https://www.ansa.org/articles/deterrence-looking-below-conventional-threshold>

⁸ Ashley Townshend, Dr. David Santoro and Brendan Thomas-Noone, (February 2019), Revisiting Deterrence in an Era of Strategic Competition US-Australia Indo-Pacific Deterrence Dialogue, pp. 4 & 5.

<https://www.ussc.edu.au/analysis/revisiting-deterrence-in-an-era-of-strategic-competition>

⁹ Ibid. See also Ely Ratner, 2019, Testimony Before the Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on Addressing China and Russia’s Emergence as Great Power Competitors and the Implementation of the National Defense Strategy, U.S. Congress. See also LtGen, Ret. Michael Dana, 2019, Future War: Not Back to the Future. War on the Rocks. See also LTG Eric Wesley (King & Boyklin, 2019), General Curtis Scaparrotti, USEUCOM 2019 posture statement to the Senate Committee on Armed Services.

¹⁰ Sean Mcfate, (May 8, 2021), “Will deterrence work, when our foes wage war disguised as peace?,”

<https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/552307-will-deterrence-work-when-our-foes-wage-war-disguised-as-peace/>

¹¹ Mallory Shelbourne, March 23, 2021, “Military Takeover of Taiwan is Top Concern for INDOPACOM Nominee Aquilino,” USNI News, <https://news.usni.org/2021/03/23/military-takeover-of-taiwan-is-top-concern-for-indopacom-nominee-aquilino>

¹² Meredith Roaten, (Sep. 9, 2021), ‘Integrated Deterrence’ to Drive National Defense Strategy, AFA NEWS, National Defense Magazine online, <https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2021/9/22/integrated-deterrence-to-drive-national-defense-strategy>

¹³ MG Matt Easley, (April 26, 2022), Deputy Principal Information Operations Advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, remarks at the OSD Phoenix Challenge 2022-1, “Information Advantage and Cognitive Security Workshop Series,” University of Maryland Applied Research Laboratory for Intelligence and Security.

¹⁴ Jim Garamone, (February 18, 2022), “Austin Says Current Operations Give Hints of New National Defense Strategy,” DOD NEWS, <https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2940956/austin-says-current-operations-give-hints-of-new-national-defense-strategy/>

¹⁵ Thomas Spoehr, (December 30, 2021), Bad Idea: Relying on “Integrated Deterrence” Instead of Building Sufficient U.S. Military Power,” The Heritage Foundation, <https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/bad-idea-relying-integrated-deterrence-instead-building-sufficient-us-military>

¹⁶ JOC, 2006, op. cit. p. 70.

¹⁷ Yasmin Tadjdeh, (March 7, 2022), “JUST IN: Russia-Ukraine Conflict Highlights Need for U.S. Tech Alliances

<https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2022/3/7/shyu-stresses-importance-of-partnerships-amid-russia-ukraine-conflict>

¹⁸ JOC, 2006, op. cit., p. 43.